53 referencias académicas prueban que el sistema electoral genera más corrupción

0

Buscaglia divulga 53 publicaciones científicas verificando que el sistema electoral de Mexico genera más Delincuencia Organizada

Por 

Aqui va una lista de 53 publicaciones científicas en revistas científicas prestigiosas que verifican que los sistemas electorales al estilo del de #México (con una mezcla de candidaturas uninominales y de candidaturas en listas de representación proporcional con partidos o con “independientes” que NO son determinadas a través de una competencia limpia en elecciones preliminares entre precandidaturas por el voto popular y que además no están sujetas a tres tipos de auditorias electorales previas a las elecciones para detectar dinero sucio) siempre causarán mas #corrupción por mas #delincuenciaorganizada en los procesos electorales, lo cual representa violaciones masivas al #derechohumano al VOTO LIMPIO.

References

Anderson, C. J. 2007. ‘The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of Democratic Accountability.’ Annual Review of Political Science. 10: 271–296.CrossRef

Anderson, C. J. and Y. V. Tverdova. 2003. ‘Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes toward Government in Contemporary Democracies.’ American Journal of Political Science. 47(1): 91–109.CrossRef

Anduiza, E., A. Gallego, and J. Muñoz. 2013. ‘Turning a Blind Eye: Experimental Evidence of Partisan Bias in Attitudes towards Corruption.’ Comparative Political Studies. doi:10.1177/0010414013489081

Arceneaux, K. and D. Nickerson. 2009. ‘Modeling Certainty with Clustered Data: A Comparison of Methods.’ Political Analysis. 17: 177–190.CrossRef

Bartels, L. M. 1996. ‘Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections.’ American Journal of Political Science. 40(1): 194–230.CrossRef

Bartels, L. M. 2002. ‘Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions.’ Political Behavior. 24(2): 117–150.CrossRef

Beck, T., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh. 2001. ‘New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions.’ World Bank Economic Review. 15(1): 165–176.

Buscaglia E, Dijk JV. Controlling organized crime and corruption in the public sector. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Forum on Crime and Society. 2003;3(1/2):1112.

Chang, E. C. C. 2005. Electoral Incentives for Political Corruption under Open-List Proportional Representation.’ Journal of Politics. 67: 716–730.CrossRef

Chang, E. C. C. and M. A. Golden. 2004. ‘Does Corruption Pay? The Survival of Politicians Charged with Malfeasance in the Postwar Italian Chamber of Deputies.’ Unpublished paper, Michigan State University and the University of California at Los Angeles.

Chang, E. C. C. and M. A. Golden. 2007. ‘Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption.’ British Journal of Political Science. 37: 115–137.CrossRef

Chang, E. C. C., M. A. Golden, and S. J. Hill, 2010. ‘Legislative Malfeasance and Political Accountability.’ Word Politics. 62(2): 177–220.CrossRef

Charron, N. 2011. ‘Party Systems, Electoral Systems and Constraints on Corruption.’ Electoral Studies. 30(4): 595–606.CrossRef

Costas-Pérez, E., A. Solé-Ollé, and P. Sorribas-Navarro. 2012. ‘Corruption Scandals, Voter Information, and Accountability.’ European Journal of Political Economy. 28(4): 469–484.CrossRef

Dahlberg, S. and M. Solevid. 2013 ‘Does Corruption Suppress Voter Turnout? A Multi-level Approach.’ In Stepping Stones: Research on Political Representation, Voting Behavior, and Quality of Government. S. Dahlberg, H. Oscarsson, and L. Wängnerud (eds). Gothenburg Studies in Politics: 133.

Evans, G. and R. Andersen. 2006. ‘The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions.’ Journal of Politics. 68(1): 194–207.CrossRef

Evans, G. and P. Rose. 2007. ‘Education and Support for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Testing Mechanisms of influence.’ Afrobarometer Working Paper. The Afrobarometer.

Ferraz, C. and F. Finan. 2008. ‘Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics. 123(2): 703–745.CrossRef

Gallagher, M. and P. Mitchell. 2008. The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford: New York.

Golden, M. A. 2006. ‘Some Puzzles of Political Corruption in Modern Advanced Democracies.’ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Japan Political Science Association, December 29, 2006, Tokyo, Japan.

Gomez, B. T. and J. M. Wilson. 2001. ‘Political Sophistication and Economic Voting in the American Electorate: A Theory of Heterogeneous Attribution.’ American Journal of Political Science. 45(4): 899–914.CrossRef

Gomez, B. T. and J. M. Wilson. 2006. ‘Cognitive Heterogeneity and Economic Voting: A Comparative Analysis of Four Democratic Electorates.’ American Journal of Political Science. 50(1): 127–145.CrossRef

Greene, W. 2007. Econometric Analysis (6th edn). New York: Prentice Hall.

Hadenius, A. and J. Teorell. 2007. ‘Pathways from Authoritarianism.’ Journal of Democracy. 18(1): 143–156.CrossRef

Hhorsten B., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh. 2001. ‘New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions.’ World Bank Economic Review. 15(1): 165–176.CrossRef

Holmberg, S. 2009. ‘Perceptions of Corruption in Mass Public.’ QoG Working Paper Series, 24. The Quality of Government Institute.

Holmberg, S. 2011. Feeling Policy Represented. Gothenburg: Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg.

Hsiao, C. 2003. Analysis of Panel Data. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Jerit, J. and J. Barabas. 2012. ‘Partisan Perceptual Bias and the Information Environment.’ Journal of Politics. 74(3): 672–684.CrossRef

Key, V. O. 1966. The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRef

Klašnja, M., J. A. Tucker, and K. Deegan-Krause. 2014. ‘Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic Corruption Voting.’ British Journal of Political Science. Available on CJO2014. doi:10.1017/S0007123414000088

Kosmidis, S. and G. Xezonakis. 2010. ‘The Undecided Voters and the Economy: Campaign Heterogeneity in the 2005 British General Election.’ Electoral Studies. 29(4): 604–616.CrossRef

Krause, S. and F. Méndez. 2009. ‘Corruption and Elections: An Empirical Study for a Cross-Section of Countries.’ Economics and Politics. 21(2): 179–200.CrossRef

Kunicová, J. and S. Rose-Ackerman. 2005. ‘Electoral Rules as Constraints on Corruption.’ British Journal of Political Science. 35(4): 573–606.CrossRef

Lau, R. R. and D. P. Redlawsk. 2006. How Voters Decide – Information Processing during Election Campaigns. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Lodge, M. and C. S. Taber. (2000). ‘Three Steps toward a Theory of Motivated Political Reasoning.’ Pp. 183–213 in Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality. A. Lupia, M. McCubbins, and S. Popkin (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Lord, C. G., L. Ross, and M. R. Lepper. 1979. ‘Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence.’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 37(11) 2098–2109.CrossRef

Manzetti, L. and C. J. Wilson. 2007. ‘Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?’ Comparative Political Studies. 40(8): 949–970.CrossRef

Myerson, R. B. 1993. ‘Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.’ Games and Economic Behavior. 5(1): 118–132.CrossRef

Nie, N., J. Junn, and K. Stehlik-Barry. 1996. Education and Democratic Citizenship in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Persson, T., G. Tabellini, and F. Trebbi. 2003. ‘Electoral Rules and Corruption.’ Journal of the European Economic Association. 1(4): 958–989.CrossRef

Peters, J. G. and S. Welch. 1980. ‘The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections.’ American Political Science Review. 74: 697–708.CrossRef

Pickup, M. and G. Evans. 2013. ‘Addressing the Endogeneity of Economic Evaluations in Models of Political Choice.’ Public Opinion Quarterly. 77(3): 735–754.CrossRef

Powell, G. B. 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Powell, G. B. and G. D. Whitten. 1993. ‘A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context.’ American Journal of Political Science. 37(2): 391–414.CrossRef

Redlawsk, D. P. 2002. ‘Hot Cognition or Cool Consideration? Testing the Effects of Motivated Reasoning on Political Decision Making.’ Journal of Politics. 64(4): 1021–1044.CrossRef

Rudolph, T. J. 2003. ‘Institutional Context and the Assignment of Political Responsibility.’ Journal of Politics. 65(1): 190–215.CrossRef

Tavits, M. 2007. ‘Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption.’ American Journal of Political Science. 51: 218–229.CrossRef

Tilley, J. and S. B. Hobolt. 2011. ‘Is the Government to Blame? An Experimental Test of How Partisanship Shapes Perceptions of Performance and Responsibility.’ Journal of Politics. 73(2): 316–330.CrossRef

Tverdova, Y. V. 2011. ‘See No Evil: Heterogeneity in Public Perceptions of Corruption.’ Canadian Journal of Political Science. 44(1): 1–25.CrossRef

Wilcox, N. T. and C. Wlezien. 1996. ‘The Contamination of Responses to Survey Items: Economic Perceptions and Political Judgments.’ Political Analysis. 5(1): 181–213.CrossRef

Wlezien, C., M. Franklin, and D. Twiggs. 1997. ‘Economic Perceptions and Vote Choice: Disentangling the Endogeneity.’ Political Behavior. 19(1): 7–17.CrossRef

Zechmeister, E. J. and D. Zizumbo-Colunga. 2013. ‘The Varying Political Toll of Concerns about Corruption in Good versus Bad Economic Times.’ Comparative Political Studies. doi:10.1177/0010414012472468

Comments are closed.