Buscaglia divulga 53 publicaciones científicas verificando que el sistema electoral de Mexico genera más Delincuencia Organizada
Aqui va una lista de 53 publicaciones científicas en revistas científicas prestigiosas que verifican que los sistemas electorales al estilo del de #México (con una mezcla de candidaturas uninominales y de candidaturas en listas de representación proporcional con partidos o con “independientes” que NO son determinadas a través de una competencia limpia en elecciones preliminares entre precandidaturas por el voto popular y que además no están sujetas a tres tipos de auditorias electorales previas a las elecciones para detectar dinero sucio) siempre causarán mas #corrupción por mas #delincuenciaorganizada en los procesos electorales, lo cual representa violaciones masivas al #derechohumano al VOTO LIMPIO.
References
Anderson, C. J. 2007. ‘The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of Democratic Accountability.’ Annual Review of Political Science. 10: 271–296.CrossRef
Anderson, C. J. and Y. V. Tverdova. 2003. ‘Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes toward Government in Contemporary Democracies.’ American Journal of Political Science. 47(1): 91–109.CrossRef
Anduiza, E., A. Gallego, and J. Muñoz. 2013. ‘Turning a Blind Eye: Experimental Evidence of Partisan Bias in Attitudes towards Corruption.’ Comparative Political Studies. doi:10.1177/0010414013489081
Arceneaux, K. and D. Nickerson. 2009. ‘Modeling Certainty with Clustered Data: A Comparison of Methods.’ Political Analysis. 17: 177–190.CrossRef
Bartels, L. M. 1996. ‘Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections.’ American Journal of Political Science. 40(1): 194–230.CrossRef
Bartels, L. M. 2002. ‘Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions.’ Political Behavior. 24(2): 117–150.CrossRef
Beck, T., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh. 2001. ‘New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions.’ World Bank Economic Review. 15(1): 165–176.
Buscaglia E, Dijk JV. Controlling organized crime and corruption in the public sector. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Forum on Crime and Society. 2003;3(1/2):1112.
Chang, E. C. C. 2005. Electoral Incentives for Political Corruption under Open-List Proportional Representation.’ Journal of Politics. 67: 716–730.CrossRef
Chang, E. C. C. and M. A. Golden. 2004. ‘Does Corruption Pay? The Survival of Politicians Charged with Malfeasance in the Postwar Italian Chamber of Deputies.’ Unpublished paper, Michigan State University and the University of California at Los Angeles.
Chang, E. C. C. and M. A. Golden. 2007. ‘Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption.’ British Journal of Political Science. 37: 115–137.CrossRef
Chang, E. C. C., M. A. Golden, and S. J. Hill, 2010. ‘Legislative Malfeasance and Political Accountability.’ Word Politics. 62(2): 177–220.CrossRef
Charron, N. 2011. ‘Party Systems, Electoral Systems and Constraints on Corruption.’ Electoral Studies. 30(4): 595–606.CrossRef
Costas-Pérez, E., A. Solé-Ollé, and P. Sorribas-Navarro. 2012. ‘Corruption Scandals, Voter Information, and Accountability.’ European Journal of Political Economy. 28(4): 469–484.CrossRef
Dahlberg, S. and M. Solevid. 2013 ‘Does Corruption Suppress Voter Turnout? A Multi-level Approach.’ In Stepping Stones: Research on Political Representation, Voting Behavior, and Quality of Government. S. Dahlberg, H. Oscarsson, and L. Wängnerud (eds). Gothenburg Studies in Politics: 133.
Evans, G. and R. Andersen. 2006. ‘The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions.’ Journal of Politics. 68(1): 194–207.CrossRef
Evans, G. and P. Rose. 2007. ‘Education and Support for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Testing Mechanisms of influence.’ Afrobarometer Working Paper. The Afrobarometer.
Ferraz, C. and F. Finan. 2008. ‘Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics. 123(2): 703–745.CrossRef
Gallagher, M. and P. Mitchell. 2008. The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford: New York.
Golden, M. A. 2006. ‘Some Puzzles of Political Corruption in Modern Advanced Democracies.’ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Japan Political Science Association, December 29, 2006, Tokyo, Japan.
Gomez, B. T. and J. M. Wilson. 2001. ‘Political Sophistication and Economic Voting in the American Electorate: A Theory of Heterogeneous Attribution.’ American Journal of Political Science. 45(4): 899–914.CrossRef
Gomez, B. T. and J. M. Wilson. 2006. ‘Cognitive Heterogeneity and Economic Voting: A Comparative Analysis of Four Democratic Electorates.’ American Journal of Political Science. 50(1): 127–145.CrossRef
Greene, W. 2007. Econometric Analysis (6th edn). New York: Prentice Hall.
Hadenius, A. and J. Teorell. 2007. ‘Pathways from Authoritarianism.’ Journal of Democracy. 18(1): 143–156.CrossRef
Hhorsten B., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh. 2001. ‘New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions.’ World Bank Economic Review. 15(1): 165–176.CrossRef
Holmberg, S. 2009. ‘Perceptions of Corruption in Mass Public.’ QoG Working Paper Series, 24. The Quality of Government Institute.
Holmberg, S. 2011. Feeling Policy Represented. Gothenburg: Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg.
Hsiao, C. 2003. Analysis of Panel Data. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Jerit, J. and J. Barabas. 2012. ‘Partisan Perceptual Bias and the Information Environment.’ Journal of Politics. 74(3): 672–684.CrossRef
Key, V. O. 1966. The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRef
Klašnja, M., J. A. Tucker, and K. Deegan-Krause. 2014. ‘Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic Corruption Voting.’ British Journal of Political Science. Available on CJO2014. doi:10.1017/S0007123414000088
Kosmidis, S. and G. Xezonakis. 2010. ‘The Undecided Voters and the Economy: Campaign Heterogeneity in the 2005 British General Election.’ Electoral Studies. 29(4): 604–616.CrossRef
Krause, S. and F. Méndez. 2009. ‘Corruption and Elections: An Empirical Study for a Cross-Section of Countries.’ Economics and Politics. 21(2): 179–200.CrossRef
Kunicová, J. and S. Rose-Ackerman. 2005. ‘Electoral Rules as Constraints on Corruption.’ British Journal of Political Science. 35(4): 573–606.CrossRef
Lau, R. R. and D. P. Redlawsk. 2006. How Voters Decide – Information Processing during Election Campaigns. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Lodge, M. and C. S. Taber. (2000). ‘Three Steps toward a Theory of Motivated Political Reasoning.’ Pp. 183–213 in Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality. A. Lupia, M. McCubbins, and S. Popkin (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Lord, C. G., L. Ross, and M. R. Lepper. 1979. ‘Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence.’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 37(11) 2098–2109.CrossRef
Manzetti, L. and C. J. Wilson. 2007. ‘Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?’ Comparative Political Studies. 40(8): 949–970.CrossRef
Myerson, R. B. 1993. ‘Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.’ Games and Economic Behavior. 5(1): 118–132.CrossRef
Nie, N., J. Junn, and K. Stehlik-Barry. 1996. Education and Democratic Citizenship in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Persson, T., G. Tabellini, and F. Trebbi. 2003. ‘Electoral Rules and Corruption.’ Journal of the European Economic Association. 1(4): 958–989.CrossRef
Peters, J. G. and S. Welch. 1980. ‘The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections.’ American Political Science Review. 74: 697–708.CrossRef
Pickup, M. and G. Evans. 2013. ‘Addressing the Endogeneity of Economic Evaluations in Models of Political Choice.’ Public Opinion Quarterly. 77(3): 735–754.CrossRef
Powell, G. B. 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Powell, G. B. and G. D. Whitten. 1993. ‘A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context.’ American Journal of Political Science. 37(2): 391–414.CrossRef
Redlawsk, D. P. 2002. ‘Hot Cognition or Cool Consideration? Testing the Effects of Motivated Reasoning on Political Decision Making.’ Journal of Politics. 64(4): 1021–1044.CrossRef
Rudolph, T. J. 2003. ‘Institutional Context and the Assignment of Political Responsibility.’ Journal of Politics. 65(1): 190–215.CrossRef
Tavits, M. 2007. ‘Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption.’ American Journal of Political Science. 51: 218–229.CrossRef
Tilley, J. and S. B. Hobolt. 2011. ‘Is the Government to Blame? An Experimental Test of How Partisanship Shapes Perceptions of Performance and Responsibility.’ Journal of Politics. 73(2): 316–330.CrossRef
Tverdova, Y. V. 2011. ‘See No Evil: Heterogeneity in Public Perceptions of Corruption.’ Canadian Journal of Political Science. 44(1): 1–25.CrossRef
Wilcox, N. T. and C. Wlezien. 1996. ‘The Contamination of Responses to Survey Items: Economic Perceptions and Political Judgments.’ Political Analysis. 5(1): 181–213.CrossRef
Wlezien, C., M. Franklin, and D. Twiggs. 1997. ‘Economic Perceptions and Vote Choice: Disentangling the Endogeneity.’ Political Behavior. 19(1): 7–17.CrossRef
Zechmeister, E. J. and D. Zizumbo-Colunga. 2013. ‘The Varying Political Toll of Concerns about Corruption in Good versus Bad Economic Times.’ Comparative Political Studies. doi:10.1177/0010414012472468
